Out-of-pocket payments are the principal source of health care finance in most Asian countries, and India is no exception. This fact has important consequences for household living standards. In this paper the author explores significant changes in the 1990s and early 2000s that appear to have occurred as a result of out-ofpocket spending on health care in 16 Indian states. Using data from the National Sample Survey on consumption expenditure undertaken in 1993-94 and 2004-05, the author measures catastrophic payments and impoverishment due to out-of-pocket payments for health care. Considerable data on the magnitude, distribution and economic consequences of out-of-pocket payments in India are provided; when compared over the study period, these indicate that new policies have significantly increased both catastrophic expenditure and impoverishment.
Introduction
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments are the principal source of health care finance in most Asian countries, and India is no exception. This fact has important consequences for household living standards. Individuals can fall below the poverty line when they pay for health care at the expense of meeting their basic needs (their level of impoverishment can be determined by subtracting OOP expenditures on health care from household resources). But too often, families have no choice but to pay for care. Medical spending is regarded as catastrophic if it exceeds a predetermined share of household income or total expenditure in a given period (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 2003) .
India was one of the poorest countries in the world in 1990, with an estimated gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of US$331. In 1991 major macroeconomic structural adjustment policies (SAPs) were introduced to replace the mixed economy with a regulated market economy. The liberalisation of the Indian economy spurred GDP growth to an unprecedented level, but it also led to a widening of income inequality in the post-reform period (Pal and Ghosh, 2007; Sen and Himanshu, 2005) . Although the level of poverty has declined since the reforms were initiated, the pace of decline has slowed since the 1980s (World Bank, 2001; Deaton, 2005) . If current trends continue, India may not meet the poverty reduction target set by the Millennium Development Goals.
The macroeconomic adjustments of the 1990s prompted some major policy shifts in the health sector. While health sector reforms in India can be traced to as early as the 1980s, as the state began to reduce its role in the provision of health care services, it was only in the 1990s that reforms began in earnest. In India, health sector reforms have been piecemeal and incremental but have led to extensive changes in the organisation, structure and delivery of health care services and financing (Sen, Iyer and George, 2002) .
One of the important policy shifts in the public health sector was the introduction of user fees during the eighth five-year plan . Because health policy is administered at the state level in India, user fees were implemented at different times in different states. The majority of states introduced the fees in the mid-to late 1990s. Also, during the late 1990s to early 2000s, many states initiated World Bank-sponsored health system reforms that further increased user fees in government hospitals. Although user fees were waived for people living below the poverty line, the definition of poor was arbitrary, leading to limited relief for most poor people (Thakur and Ghosh, 2009 ).
The second policy change was mainly related to the decline of government spending on health. The SAPs forced the central and state governments to drastically reduce funding for the social sector.
Public expenditure in the health sector was further squeezed at the state level in the 1990s (Mooij and Dev, 2002) , leading to a government failure to meet the public's health care needs. As public health investment decreased and user fees in the public sector increased, the private sector moved in to exploit the market opportunity (Peters et al., 2002; Bhat, 1996) .
Another major development in the health sector occurred with the introduction of the new Drug Price Control Order (DPCO) in 1994. According to the DPCO (1995) , only 74 out of 500 commonly used bulk drugs were to be kept under statutory price control. The pharmaceutical sector was further liberalised in 2002. The impact of these drug policy changes could be seen in the spiralling increase in drug prices during the period 1994-2004 (National Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2005) .
All these developments in the health sector are expected to push OOP health payments upward in both public and private facilities, and these increases, in turn, are likely to affect health care utilisation and overall health. They can also have a disrupting effect on household living standards.
In the absence of adequate insurance coverage-and more than 95 percent of India's population has no health insurance-expenditures to treat illness can lead to financial catastrophe, pushing individuals or households into poverty or deepening their existing poverty (van Doorslaer et al., 2006; Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003; Xu et al., 2003) .
It is therefore important to assess how the increase in OOP health payments might impact household living standards in India, especially in the context of the ongoing health sector reforms.
Empirical studies conducted in many countries on the effects of these policies point to severe negative consequences (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003; O'Donnell et al., 2007; Chaudhuri and Roy, 2008; Garg and Karan, 2009 ). Such findings have become a major concern for policy makers working on the financing of health care throughout the world (Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, 2001; OECD and WHO, 2003; World Bank, 2004; WHO, 2005; World Health Report, 2008) .
In this paper, the author explores significant changes that appear to have occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s as a result of an increase in OOP spending on health care in India in general and 16 major Indian states in particular. The data given are from the National Sample Survey (NSS) on consumption expenditure undertaken in 1993-94 and 2004-05 . The author seeks to analyse (i) the changes in OOP spending during this period, (ii) health-financing contributions and composition in both periods, (iii) the magnitude and distribution of OOP payments relative to total household consumption expenditure across economic classes, (iv) the extent of catastrophic health care expenditure due to OOP payments and (v) the changes in the magnitude and depth of impoverishment because of OOP payments for health care. This paper is organised as follows: the next section describes the data and the methods used. Section 3 presents background information on the financing contribution and composition of OOP payments. Section 4 deals with the changes in the magnitude and distribution of OOP payments relative to total household consumption expenditure across economic classes. Section 5 shows the changes in the incidence and intensity of catastrophic expenditure. Section 6 presents the changes in the level and depth of impoverishment due to OOP payments across states. And, finally, section 7 presents a discussion of the data.
Methods

Catastrophic payments for health care
The methodology applied by this study to measure catastrophic payments for health care has been discussed by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2003) . An OOP payment for health care is considered catastrophic when the payment exceeds some threshold (Z cat ), defined as a fraction of total household consumption or non-food consumption. If T represents OOP payments for health care, x represents total household expenditure and f(x) stands for food expenditure, then a household is said to have incurred catastrophic payments when T/x or T/[x-f(x)] exceeds a specified threshold,
One of the approaches used to measure catastrophic payments for health care involves analysing the incidence of catastrophic payments-that is, the percentage of households that spend more on health care than the threshold, which can be measured by the headcount (H cat 
where N is the sample size and µ E is the mean of E i , while H cat captures only the incidence of any catastrophes occurring and O captures the intensity of the occurrence as well.
In order to determine whether poor households incur more catastrophic payments than rich households, the concentration index (CI) of E i can be calculated. Positive values of the CI for E i indicate a greater tendency for rich households to exceed the threshold, while negative values indicate a greater tendency for poor households to exceed the threshold.
Measuring impoverishment due to health care expenditure
In measuring impoverishment-that is, the extent to which households are made poor or poorer by making OOP payments for health care-two measures of poverty can be used: the poverty headcount and the poverty gap. While the poverty headcount measures the number of households living below the poverty line as a percentage of total households, the poverty gap captures the depth of poverty or the amount by which poor households fall short of reaching the poverty line. 
where N is the sample size.
The average pre-payment poverty gap is defined as
where N is the sample size and . 
which allows comparative analysis as it eliminates differences in currency or the choice of the poverty line. Post-payment is defined as x i after the subtraction of payments for health care. Postpayments can be calculated following the same formula as for pre-payment. The effects of OOP payments on poverty, termed 'poverty impact' (PI), are then defined as the difference between the relevant pre-payment and post-payment measures, such as:
Data
Cross-sectional data are taken from the fiftieth ii All the variables related to expenditure are converted to a monthly figure.
In both these rounds, a stratified multistage sample design was adopted, using census villages for the round. Since data were collected over a full year, the estimates of health expenditure were expected to be largely free from seasonal fluctuations. The analysis was done at the country and state level.
However, smaller states-those with a population of less than 10 million-were not included. The mean share of OOP health care expenditure in relation to monthly household consumption expenditure significantly increased from 4.39 percent in 1993-94 to 5.51 percent (Table 3) . However, OOP spending on inpatient care is much higher in these richer states (15-23 percent of total OOP expenditure) than in their poorer counterparts. Though average OOP payments on health care as a share of total consumption expenditure have registered a substantial increase for the majority of the states, significant differences in the mean OOP budget across states persist. There is a positive relationship between the share of OOP health payments and the level of economic development of states, as measured by the per capita state domestic product (SDP) (Figure 1 ).
Findings
However, the gradient is not very steep, indicating that this relationship is rather weak.
During the study period, the highest increase in OOP payments on health care as a share of total household consumption expenditure was observed in Kerala (4.7 percent), Himachal Pradesh (2.5 percent), Maharashtra (2.0 percent) and Gujarat (1.9 percent) ( Table 3 ). This reflects the increase in health care utilisation in these states over the study period.
Uttar Pradesh, one of the poorest states of India, has a very high OOP share compared with many high-income states, and this share increased during the period considered. This could be explained by the fact that government expenditure on health care declined at an annual rate of 1.54 percent from 1993-94 to -03 (Economic Research Foundation, 2006 . Furthermore, the high health care utilisation of private providers (The proportion of population utilising health care services from the private sector is almost 90 percent 1 ) due to insufficient public health care infrastructure may have also contributed to the prevailing high OOP share in Uttar Pradesh. Two states, Bihar and Karnataka, have reduced their OOP share over time. Since Bihar continues to be the poorest state in India, households have little choice but to divert their resources for other necessary food and non-food consumption. This could also be due to the poor availability of health care services, which has led to low health care utilisation (NSSO, 2006 The CIs of OOP payment for health care, which rank households according to their income on the in Orissa, which has the highest incidence of poverty. Rather, the high inequality in the OOP payments share is more likely due to the fact that the households of the poorer quintiles have far fewer resources with which to respond to their health care needs than the richer quintiles. The same argument is applicable for India as a whole, which showed an increase in the CI of OOP payments over the study period.
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that although Kerala has the highest average OOP health care spending share (10.5 percent of total consumption), there is very little variation in this share across consumption expenditure quintiles. This might be explained by the fact that Kerala is India's most literate state, a place where households across the socio-economic strata have been exposed to an extensive health care infrastructure. Consequently, they are more conscious about their health care needs and are willing to spend a larger proportion of their resources on health care than households in other states. Although Maharashtra, Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh present as high an average share of OOP payments for health care as Kerala, they also present a steep gradient.
The most dramatic declines in the gradient for OOP payments on health care can be seen in Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar, while a steep increase in the income gradient has occurred in Karnataka and Punjab. 
Catastrophic payments
Catastrophic spending on health occurs when a household must reduce its basic expenses over a certain period of time, sell assets, or accumulate debts in order to cope with the medical bills of one or more of its members. Since there are no universally accepted cut-off values or thresholds for defining the catastrophic nature of health care payments, the catastrophic headcount has been defined as the percentage of households spending more than a 5-25 percent share of their total consumption expenditure on health care. However, it is evident from other empirical studies that 10 percent of total expenditure is widely accepted as the standard, as this represents an approximate threshold at which the household is forced to cut down on subsistence needs, sell productive assets, incur debts or be impoverished (van Doorslaer et al., 2006) . The impact of the increase in the share of OOP expenditure can be seen in the incidence of catastrophic expenditure (Table 4) Karnataka could perhaps be explained by the fact that OOP payments declined during the study period. These findings corroborate available evidence from both developed and middle-income countries: most countries that have advanced social institutions-pre-payment financing mechanisms and welfare policies such as social insurance and high subsidies to the health system to protect households from catastrophic health spending-face a lower incidence of catastrophic health care expenditure.
However, it is worrisome that some states, like Kerala, saw the incidence of catastrophic spending double over the study period. In 2004-05, as many as 53 percent of households in Kerala incurred OOP spending in excess of 5 percent of their pre-payment consumption expenditure, and 32 percent of the sample spent more than 10 percent of their total consumption expenditure.
CIs, which reflect how the proportion of households exceeding the threshold vary across the income distribution, are presented in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that at each threshold, the incidence of catastrophic health payments was concentrated among the rich households in both 1993-94 and 2004-05 and increased over the periods studied. Even if the threshold is raised from 5 percent to 25 percent of total consumption expenditure, the proportion of rich households with catastrophic expenditure still increases for both years. However, it is important to note that rich households are more likely than poor ones to spend their savings on health care and thus are less likely to experience real impoverishing impact of such expenditure (Berman et al., 2010) .
The intensity of catastrophic payments is measured by the amount by which OOP payments exceed the defined threshold (for example, 10 percent of total expenditure); this margin is referred to as the 'catastrophic overshoot' (Wagstaff and van Doorslaer, 2003) . Since wealthier households spend a larger fraction of their income on health care than poor ones do, they are more likely to overshoot the threshold by a larger amount. This holds true whatever the threshold, though for each threshold there was a greater concentration of overshooting among the better-off in 2004-05 than in 1993-94 (Table 4) . Defining the catastrophic payment as 10 percent of total consumption expenditure, Kerala has the highest mean overshoot ( Figure 5 ). Also, the mean overshoot pattern across states (presented in Figure 6 ) is akin to the pattern depicted by the catastrophic headcount.
However, a significant amount of variation exists across states in the distribution of catastrophic health care payments across income classes. The impoverishing impact of health care spending
In this section, the impact of OOP payments on various measures of poverty over the period in question is examined. (1.31 percent). On the contrary, the incidence of poverty due to OOP payments declined in Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Punjab and Assam.
Discussion
OOP payments are the principal means of financing health care in most low-income countries, and India follows this pattern.
This study has provided considerable evidence on trends governing the magnitude, distribution and economic consequences of OOP payments for health care in India during a period of reform.
The evidence suggests that the new policies have had a major impact in increasing the incidence of There are considerable interstate differences in the mean OOP budget. The results suggest a positive relationship between the share of OOP health payments and the level of economic development of states measured by the per capita SDP. Apart from income and the availability of health services, the mechanism of health care financing seemed to play an important role toward deciding state differences in OOP spending on health care. Where public health care investment and insurance coverage were higher, the OOP payment share was lower (Karnataka). However, this does not explain the full amplitude of OOP payment share differences by state. For instance, the OOP payment share reported in Maharashtra was much higher even though public investment and insurance coverage were relatively better in this state. On the other hand, in Uttar Pradesh, the OOP payment share is second highest in the country despite very low public health spending.
Drugs accounted for 61-88 percent of the total OOP payments across states, which is several times higher than in established market economies and which clearly points to the overuse of Pradesh (8.3 percent), Gujarat (6.8 percent) and Andhra Pradesh (5.3 percent), where the OOP payments share also increased over the study period. Surprisingly, in Gujarat, the CI value decreased from 0.07 to 0.01 for catastrophic expenditure, indicating that the poorest households were making more catastrophic health payments, which is contrary to the notion that community health insurance has gone far toward containing the impact of health care costs on poor households (Ranson, 2003) . The distribution of catastrophic payments also differs across states.
Barring a few states, catastrophic expenditure is more evenly distributed in economically betterperforming states than in their disadvantaged counterparts. In most of the poorest states, it is the richer households that can afford to spend a larger fraction of their resources on health care, while the poorer ones are not in a position to divert their resources from other needs.
However, contrary to the hypothesis that an increase in OOP payments leads to a reduction (or regression) in the progressivity of the financial burden of health care, the results suggest that at every threshold, the incidence of catastrophic health payments became more concentrated among rich households over the period 1993-94 to 2004-05-both across India and in most of the selected states. This has to do with the limitations of the methodological approach adopted in this study. The main problem with its focus on catastrophic payments and impoverishment is that it misses a huge number of households that do not have the financial capacity to utilise health care services and therefore could not be quantified (Pradhan and Presscott, 2002) . The results of this paper imply that lower-and middle-income households bear the brunt of the ongoing health care reforms. The evidence points toward higher incidences of impoverishment among these populations. Therefore, a rather broad-based risk pooling and pre-payment measure (balancing between sick and healthy) would seem to be a better financing strategy as it would limit OOP spending, increase financial protection, reduce the risk of impoverishment and ensure the utilisation of health care services by the poorest of the poor. Alternatively, high OOP payments for health care and their consequent effects on household living standards can be prevented by subsidising drugs for low-income households (from lower-middle-class households to those living below the poverty line) and by increasing the contribution of both public-and private-sector spending on health care, which would in turn reduce the household burden.
